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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 




JOHNNY LEE GIBBS, 
 












          NO. 44432 
 
          Bannock County Case No.  
          CR-2012-16304 
 
           
          RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
 
     
      Issue 
Has Gibbs failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by 




Gibbs Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion 
 
 Gibbs pled guilty to failure to register as a sex offender and, on June 17, 2013, 
the district court imposed a unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed, 
suspended the sentence, and placed Gibbs on supervised probation for four years.  (R., 
pp.123-31.)  Approximately one month later, Gibbs violated his probation by committing 
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(and later pleading guilty to) two counts of introduction of contraband into a correctional 
facility.  (R., pp.132-33, 141-44, 148-50.)  The district court continued Gibbs on 
supervised probation.  (R., pp.167-70.)   
Gibbs subsequently violated his probation a second time by failing to complete a 
polygraph examination, failing to notify his supervising officer that he had been 
prescribed a narcotic medication (hydrocodone), consuming alcohol, possessing 
alcohol, and testing positive for methamphetamine, amphetamine, and marijuana.  (R., 
pp.181-83, 193-94.)  The district court revoked Gibbs’ probation, executed the 
underlying sentence, and retained jurisdiction.  (R., pp.196-204.)  Following the period 
of retained jurisdiction, on December 14, 2015, the district court suspended Gibbs’ 
sentence and placed him on supervised probation for three years.  (R., pp.209-11.)     
Less than five months later, Gibbs violated the conditions of his probation a third 
time by again failing to complete a polygraph examination, failing to make any payments 
toward his cost of supervision, failing to seek and maintain employment, failing to pay 
his sex offender registration fee, using methamphetamine, frequenting a bar, and being 
terminated from CAPP Aftercare and from the COS Cross Roads High Cost of 
Supervision Group for failure to attend.  (R., pp.221-23, 247-51.)  At the disposition 
hearing held on July 25, 2016, Gibbs requested that the district court either “commute 
[his] sentence to a one-year local incarceration” with credit for time served and work 
release, or revoke his probation and order executed a reduced sentence of four years, 
with two years fixed.  (7/25/16 Tr., p.149, L.1 – p.150, L.1.)  The district court granted 
Gibbs’ request by revoking his probation and executing a reduced unified sentence of 
four years, with two years fixed.  (R., pp.247-51; 7/25/16 Tr., p.151, Ls.15-21; p.155, 
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Ls.2-6.)  Gibbs filed a notice of appeal timely from the district court’s order revoking 
probation.  (R., pp.255-58.)   
Gibbs asserts that the district court abused its discretion by revoking his 
probation and executing a reduced sentence in light of his excuses for his two 
convictions for failure to register as a sex offender; his claim that he poses no danger to 
society because his 1995 rape offense was “apparently” not a violent crime and he did 
not abscond supervision; his belief that he “is still being punished” for the rape offense 
because he received sentences for his failure to register offenses; his difficulty finding a 
job (despite the fact that he failed to contact the employers provided to him by his 
probation officer (R., p.221)); because he “simply does not do well with supervision” and 
future placement on community supervision “will almost certainly not go well for [him]”; 
and because prison, probation and parole “have not had a positive effect on [his] 
rehabilitation” and “are not effective at deterring [him] from failing to register” or from 
failing to comply with the terms of community supervision and are, therefore, “a waste of 
the state’s resources.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp.5-12.)  Gibbs’ claim of an abuse of 
sentencing discretion is barred by the doctrine of invited error.   
A party is estopped, under the doctrine of invited error, from complaining that a 
ruling or action of the trial court that the party invited, consented to or acquiesced in was 
error.  State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 402, 3 P.3d 67, 80 (Ct. App. 2000).  The 
purpose of the invited error doctrine is to prevent a party who “caused or played an 
important role in prompting a trial court” to take a particular action from “later 
challenging that decision on appeal.”  State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 240, 985 P.2d 117, 
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120 (1999).  This doctrine applies to sentencing decisions as well as to rulings during 
trial.  State v. Leyva, 117 Idaho 462, 465, 788 P.2d 864, 867 (Ct. App. 1990).  
Gibbs acknowledges that, at the disposition hearing for his third probation 
violation, he requested – as one of two “options” – that the district court “impose the 
underlying sentence of five years, with two years fixed, but reduce the indeterminate 
portion by one year.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp.4-5; 7/25/16 Tr., p.149, L.1 – p.150, L.1.)  
The district court granted Gibbs’ request and revoked his probation and executed a 
reduced unified sentence of four years, with two years fixed, stating, “I’m doing what he 
asked me to do.”  (7/25/16 Tr., p.151, Ls.15-21; p.155, Ls.2-6.)  Because Gibbs 
requested that that the district court revoke his probation and order executed a reduced 
unified sentence of four years, with two years fixed, he cannot claim on appeal that the 
district court abused its discretion by doing exactly that.  Therefore, Gibbs’ claim of an 
abuse of sentencing discretion is barred by the doctrine of invited error and the district 
court’s order revoking probation and executing a reduced sentence should be affirmed. 
Even if this Court considers the merits of Gibbs’ claim, Gibbs has still failed to 
establish an abuse of discretion.  “Probation is a matter left to the sound discretion of 
the court.”  I.C. § 19-2601(4).  The decision to revoke probation lies within the sound 
discretion of the district court.  State v. Roy, 113 Idaho 388, 392, 744 P.2d, 116, 120 
(Ct. App. 1987); State v. Drennen, 122 Idaho 1019, 842 P.2d 698 (Ct. App. 1992).   
When deciding whether to revoke probation, the district court must consider “whether 
the probation [was] achieving the goal of rehabilitation and [was] consistent with the 
protection of society.”  Drennen, 122 Idaho at 1022, 842 P.2d at 701. 
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Upon revoking a defendant’s probation, a court may order the original sentence 
executed or reduce the sentence as authorized by Idaho Criminal Rule 35.  State v. 
Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28, 218 P.3d 5, 7 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing State v. Beckett, 122 
Idaho 324, 326, 834 P.2d 326, 328 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Marks, 116 Idaho 976, 977, 
783 P.2d 315, 316 (Ct. App. 1989)).  A court’s decision not to reduce a sentence is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion subject to the well-established standards governing 
whether a sentence is excessive.  Hanington, 148 Idaho at 28, 218 P.3d at 7.  Those 
standards require an appellant to “establish that, under any reasonable view of the 
facts, the sentence was excessive considering the objectives of criminal punishment.” 
 State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 933, 104 P.3d 969, 975 (2005).  Those objectives are: 
“(1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) 
the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrong doing.”  State 
v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384, 582, P.2d 728, 730 (1978).  The reviewing court “will 
examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the original judgment,” 
i.e., “facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring 
between the original sentencing and the revocation of probation.”  Hanington, 148 Idaho 
at 29, 218 P.3d at 8.    
On appeal, Gibbs essentially argues that, because he has consistently refused to 
abide by the law and the conditions of community supervision, and has failed to 
rehabilitate or be deterred, his sentence should have been commuted and he should 
have been placed in the county jail for one year, with work release.  (Appellant’s brief, 
pp.1, 4-12.)  Gibbs’ argument is completely illogical.  To commute and reduce a 
defendant’s sentence because he repeatedly and willfully violates the conditions of 
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probation, commits new crimes, has not been deterred from committing new crimes or 
from violating the terms of community supervision, and has failed to rehabilitate runs 
contrary to the goals of sentencing and the very purpose of probation.  It would be 
improper to set a standard that effectively sends the message that, if a defendant 
routinely refuses to abide by the conditions of community supervision and fails to 
rehabilitate while in the community, the defendant is entitled to have his sentence 
commuted and reduced.  Gibbs’ placement on probation was a test of his ability to 
abide by rules and restrictions, and he quite profoundly failed, demonstrating his 
unsuitability for placement in the community.  In no way can probation meet the goals of 
protecting the community and rehabilitation if the probationer chooses to disregard the 
terms of probation, commit new crimes, and refuse to participate in rehabilitative 
programs.  This is particularly aggravating where, as here, the offender has an ongoing 
pattern of disregarding the law and the conditions of community supervision.   
Gibbs’ claim that “there is no indication that [he] poses any threat to society” is 
belied both by his criminal history and by his repeated decisions not to register as a sex 
offender.  (Appellant’s brief, p.7.)  Gibbs’ criminal record contains convictions for 
multiple crimes that pose a threat to society, including, inter alia, DUI, 
inattentive/careless driving (amended from DUI), grand theft, trespassing, disturbing the 
peace, aggravated battery (amended from rape), rape, resisting/obstructing officers 
(amended from failure to register as a sex offender), and two convictions for failure to 
register as a sex offender.  (PSI, pp.8-12.1)  As stated in I.C. § 18-8302: 
                                            
1 PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file 
“CONFIDENTIAL CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS GIBBS 44432.pdf.”   
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The legislature finds that sexual offenders present a danger and 
that efforts of law enforcement agencies to protect their communities, 
conduct investigations and quickly apprehend offenders who commit 
sexual offenses are impaired by the lack of current information available 
about individuals who have been convicted of sexual offenses who live 
within their jurisdiction.  …  Therefore, this state’s policy is to assist efforts 
of local law enforcement agencies to protect communities by requiring 
sexual offenders to register with local law enforcement agencies and to 
make certain information about sexual offenders available to the public as 
provided in this chapter. 
 
I.C. § 18-8302 (emphasis added).  Gibbs has repeatedly disregarded the measures put 
in place to minimize the risk he poses to the community.  He presents a danger to 
society, as evinced by his continuing refusal to comply with his requirement to register 
as a sex offender. 
Gibbs’ claim that he “is still being punished for a crime he committed over twenty 
years ago” is incorrect.  (Appellant’s brief, p.8.)  Gibbs’ sentence in this case is for his 
second conviction for failure to register as a sex offender, and the execution of his 
sentence is the direct result of his repeated decisions to violate the conditions of his 
probation and his failure to rehabilitate, or even attend required rehabilitative programs, 
while in the community.  (R., pp.132-33, 181-83, 221-23.)   
On appeal, Gibbs acknowledges that, “if history is any indication,” another term 
of community supervision “will almost certainly not go well for [him].”  (Appellant’s brief, 
p.12.)  Indeed, past behavior can reasonably be viewed as an indicator of future 
behavior, particularly where a pattern of illegal conduct, refusal to comply with legal 
requirements, and failure to be deterred has been established.  Gibbs has already twice 
been afforded the opportunity of the retained jurisdiction program, and he has 
previously been afforded numerous opportunities on community supervision, but, 
subsequent to his conviction for rape, he violated each time.  (PSI, pp.10-13; R., 
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pp.209-10.)  Gibbs was fully aware that failing to submit to polygraph testing, failing to 
attend his assigned programming, frequenting bars, and using alcohol, marijuana and 
methamphetamine were violations of the conditions of his probation, yet he was not 
deterred by the knowledge that his entire sentence could be imposed.  (R., pp.221-22; 
PSI, p.55.)  His most recent decision to disregard his legal obligations is a continuation 
of his pattern of criminal conduct and demonstrates his failure to rehabilitate and his 
continued risk to the community.  At the disposition hearing, Gibbs’ probation officer 
recommended that Gibbs’ original sentence be executed, stating: 
Mr. Gibbs' probation since I took over the caseload, quite frankly, has 
been very poor.  He had a lack of motivation to complete anything I have 
asked him to.  He continued to drink alcohol or be in bars.  Between this 
and the last violation, they both had alcohol involved, both of them 
involved methamphetamine.   
 
I believe, also, one of the biggest factors I can see is failure to 
complete polygraphs.  It's kind of a tool we use to verify compliance on 
anything.  He hasn't completed polygraphs since -- I think May of 2015.  
Granted, some of that time he was incarcerated on his Rider, but that's at 
least two polygraph examinations that he hasn't completed.  So there is no 
way to verify the whole time how compliant he has been with probation on 
a whole.   
 
With those in mind, I think it puts him in a high risk even though it's 
fail to register, he has had a sex crime in his past.  Using alcohol, 
methamphetamine, all of that, I think, puts him at a high risk to the public 
at this point.   
 
(7/25/16 Tr., p.141, L.5 – p.142, L.3.)   
Gibbs is not an appropriate candidate for probation.  His ongoing unwillingness to 
comply with the terms of community supervision, substance abuse, and failure to 
participate in community-based rehabilitative programs demonstrate that probation was 
not achieving the goals of rehabilitation or protection of the community.  The district 
court showed leniency when, upon revoking Gibbs’ probation, it reduced the 
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indeterminate portion of his sentence by one year.  Gibbs has not shown that he was 
entitled to further leniency, particularly in light of his abysmal performance on 
community supervision and the continued risk he poses to society.  Given any 
reasonable view of the facts, Gibbs has failed to establish that the district court abused 
its discretion by revoking his probation and executing a reduced unified sentence of four 
years, with two years fixed.   
 
Conclusion 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s order 
revoking Gibbs’ probation and executing a reduced unified sentence of four years, with 
two years fixed. 
       




      __/s/_Lori A. Fleming_____________ 
      LORI A. FLEMING 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
      VICTORIA RUTLEDGE 
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